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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to establish a baseline for how citizens evaluate the EU nearly a 
decade into the economic and transnational migration crisis. We will use a newly assembled 
Eurobarometer representation file (1993-2014) to examine whether mass publics have changed 
the basis upon which they evaluate the EU’s performance. The primary question at hand is 
whether the current crisis is viewed by citizens mainly through the lens of economic issues, as 
much prior research would lead us to expect (Anderson 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 2003) or 
whether the flares in nationalist cross-border skirmishes between, say German and Greek 
politicians, reflect a deeper nationalism that resonates with European publics when they evaluate 
the EU. Analyses of several Eurobarometer surveys offer support for the expectation that the 
influence of utilitarian considerations and, to an even greater extent, nationalism has increased 
since the start of the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the 74th Annual Midwest Political Science Association 
Conference, April 7-10, 2016 in Chicago, Illinois.  
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This paper aims to establish a baseline for how citizens evaluate the EU nearly a decade 
into the economic and transnational migration crisis. We will use a newly assembled 
Eurobarometer representation file (1993-2014) to examine whether mass publics have changed 
the basis upon which they evaluate the EU’s performance. The primary question at hand is 
whether the current crisis is viewed by citizens mainly through the lens of economic issues, as 
much prior research would lead us to expect (Anderson 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 2003) or 
whether the flares in nationalist cross-border skirmishes between, say German and Greek 
politicians, reflect a deeper nationalism that resonates with European publics when they 
evaluate the EU.  
Given this overarching objective, we assess the relative merits of instrumental versus 
nationalist explanations for popular evaluations about the EU in late 2014. A focus on just the 
past few years, however, begs the question of standards: any pattern of relative predictive 
strength of economic and identity factors will immediately raise questions about whether their 
relevance has changed since the onset of the crisis. Therefore, this paper will also examine how 
the relative merits of instrumental and nationalist yardsticks have changed over time in the 
public mind. It stands to reason that economic perceptions matter nowadays; even that their 
importance has increased since the onset of the crisis. We would be hard pressed to predict 
otherwise. We may also surmise that nationalist sentiments have risen recently (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008), though one recent analysis suggests that they actually declined in the past few 
years (Fligstein and Polyakova 2016). But even if we diagnose a decline in levels of nationalism, 
it is another question whether these sentiments relate to the EU in ways that they did not 
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before the crisis unfolded. They may increasingly structure evaluations of the EU for those who 
hold strong nationalist orientations, for example.   
Generally, then, we ask: do publics increasingly evaluate the EU on the basis of its 
economic performance? If so, evaluations of the EU, however negative, may be primarily driven 
by instrumental considerations that come and go in response to economic conditions. Or are 
those intuitions correct which suggest that nationalist sentiments increasingly drive EU 
evaluations, even if levels of nationalism appear to have been contained? While cross-sectional 
analyses are very important in showing which factor matters the most for any point in time, we 
need a longer historical baseline of whether instrumental or nationalist criteria underlie the 
recent decline of confidence in the EU (Roth Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2013; Armingeon and 
Ceka 2013).  
We take as our baseline the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1993 for theoretical as 
well as data-related reasons. Theoretically, it stands to reasons that the onset of realizing 
political integration in Europe provides a useful marker to compare the attitudes of mass 
publics about the EU over time. Practically, as we will show below, our representation file 
contains few indicators before the 1993 Eurobarometers so that we rely on those that were 
conducted between 1993 and 2014.1 
 
Instrumental Considerations, National Identity and European integration. 
 There can be no doubt that the way the Euro’s flawed architecture, along with the 
transnational migration issues, has revealed once again how divided the continent can be when 
                                                            
1 We continually update the representation file and will make it publicly available as a beta version soon. 
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its supra-national framework is called upon to solve a pressing, transnational issue. The 
architecture of the Euro has been severely criticized for its enormous complexity of having 
multiple governments coordinate the fiscal and budgetary framework of one currency (Grouwe 
2013). The failure to recognize that Europe’s “regions” (i.e. countries) pursue diverging 
interests that often cannot be reconciled—austerity versus spending comes immediately to 
mind—has led to a near paralysis in the EU’s ability to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. The 
recent transnational issue of refugees from a war-torn country, along with a tide of economic 
migrants from outside Europe and EU-applicant countries, further reinforce the need for supra-
national solutions that involve complex supranational mechanisms.  
Given the EU’s apparent limitations to provide a functional institutional framework to 
solve these issues, support for the EU in various forms has dropped substantially since 2007 
(Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Roth, Nowack-Lehmann, and Otter 2013). One detailed analysis 
shows, for instance, that most indicators show a precipitous decline of mass trust in the EU in 
most EU countries between 2007 and 2011, except for Scandinavian democracies (Armingeon 
and Ceka 2013, p. 96). The study also finds that economic perceptions and factors significantly 
shape mass attitudes towards the EU, thus suggesting an interpretation that emphasizes the 
instrumental-rational public: economic conditions deteriorated and therefore people lower 
their evaluations of the EU, either trust in various institutions or, as we show below, the 
performance of the “EU democracy”.   
Political parties have taken note of these developments, partially responding to the rise 
of anti-migrant and anti-EU sentiments as in case of the British UKIP, Hungarian Fidesz, and the 
French National Front; partially instigating these controversies. The rise of these parties has 
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especially put pressure on mainstream parties. These parties have found it difficult to respond 
to transnational issues, especially European integration, which tends to cross-cut socio-
economic alliances between parties and voters, thereby providing incentives for mainstream 
parties to downplay or blur these issues (Meguid 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016).  
But their rise also suggests that the issues over integration and especially migration may 
not be exclusively driven by rational-economic considerations. Some Euro-skeptic elites, like 
UKIP in the UK, often stress the economic implications of cross-border migration. Others, 
however, fuse economic motives with identity-based arguments that connect national interests 
to fears over economic issues and migrants. The French National Front and Hungary’s Jobbik 
are prime examples of this fusion. But new right-wing neo-populist parties, which are less 
overtly stooped in an ethnic-based appeal, also appeal to a sense of nationalism in a more 
subtle form; for example, through their party-labels (e.g., Alternative for Germany).  
What the initial rise of EU skepticism and the success of EU skeptic parties suggest is the 
possibility that they invoke appeals not just to an economic-rational calculus among publics but 
also one that is based on nationalist identities. This seems so obvious nowadays that one 
forgets that this “truism” has not been established—to our knowledge, there is no longitudinal 
analysis that traces the development of identity and EU-skepticism over time, even though 
some analyses clearly show that national identity mattered even during the relatively tranquil 
pre-crisis years (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2008). Additionally, these intuitions raise 
questions about the veracity of economic accounts even for the migration-crisis era: perhaps 
economic issues are primarily seen through a lens of nationalism given that the debt crisis 
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involves the transfer of resources across nations. Let us therefore consider how economic and 
national identity may shape evaluations of the EU.  
 Economic Factors. This well-established perspective suggests in various guises that 
economic factors drive public evaluations of the EU. The primary line of reasoning asserts that 
instrumental considerations – specifically, the financial costs and benefits of European 
integration – determine support for the EU. In essence, evaluations are based on the EU’s 
expected or actual effects on an individual’s or the country’s economic well-being. At the 
individual-level, the most likely EU supporters are those with the knowledge, experience and/or 
skill sets to take advantage of the economic opportunities created by the common market 
(Gabel and Palmer 1995, Duch and Taylor 1997, Gabel 1998, Hooghe, et al 2007). Moreover, 
individuals with significant capital assets or trade investments prefer the monetary stability and 
market opportunities created by European integration (Scheve 2000, Gabel 2001). At the 
country-level, public support for the EU varies along with both perceived and actual levels of 
economic growth, unemployment and inflation within each EU member state (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995) as well as the extent of intra-EU trade and economic 
assistance from the EU institutions (Brinegar, et al 2004, Eichenberg and Dalton 2007).  
How do economic concerns affect judgments about the EU over time? In more 
theoretical terms, how has the growing salience of economic issues affected the basis upon 
which people view a supra-national framework? To answer this question (and that of the role of 
identity; see below), we must consider how contextual factors shape the basis upon which 
individuals judge political objects. There are obviously a myriad of candidates, including the 
personal environment of respondents, the influence of the mass media, the stances of political 
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elites, and many more. A macro-salience argument bundles the influence of these factors on 
individuals by arguing that the importance of national issues—such as the economy, the 
environment, the quality of institutions, migration, etc.—direct people’s attention to one type 
of issue and away from others. The macro-salience perspective is based on the issue-framing 
research, which seeks to understand how the presentation of issues invokes different 
“considerations” (Druckman 2004). Even subtle changes in an issue’s presentation can shift the 
basis upon which people judge political objects. In an environment that stresses law-and-order, 
people are more likely to support restrictions on the freedoms of extremists; stress individual 
liberties in an otherwise identically-worded question and people are more likely to extend this 
freedom even to extremists. The macro-salience theory extends and applies this individual-level 
mechanism to understand how changes in “context”—predominantly national factors—
influence the basis upon which a political stimulus is evaluated (Rohrschneider and Loveless 
2010; Druckman and Parkin 2005).  
The last several years offer an ideal period to investigate these questions. Over this 
period of time, the member states of the EU have experienced significant economic change. 
The sovereign debt crisis, spurred by the revelation that a number of EU member states were 
unable to maintain payments on their debt obligations, has depressed economic growth across 
Europe, prompted austerity programs that have slashed government spending on public 
programs and lead to sustained, record levels of unemployment in many European countries. 
While one might imagine even worse economic conditions, we suspect the recent changes may 
be enough to shift the criteria with which individuals assess the EU. The most obvious 
possibility is that the financial crisis has exacerbated economic insecurities and elevated the 
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importance of economic concerns for individuals as they develop positions on European 
integration. For these reasons, we hypothesize on the basis of the macro-salience argument:  
H1: The salience of economic criteria for assessments of EU democracy has increased 
since the onset of the economic crisis.  
 
National identity. A potential rival expectation, however, arises from the fact that the 
economic crisis did not just invoke instrumental concerns but also stimulated nationalist 
sentiments. Even before the transnational migration crisis unfolded, national stereotypes 
informed and shaped international controversies, as when German chancellor Merkel was 
portrayed as Hitler in the Greek media or Greek citizens are as described as lazy in the German 
boulevard press. And we know from prior research that an individual’s political identity can 
exert a potent influence on her attitudes toward the EU. Many individuals develop strong 
affective connections with the political-territorial unit in which they reside, usually the unit 
recognized as the nation-state. The literature on national identity identifies two types of 
identification with the nation-state: civic and ethnic nationalism (Eisenstadt and Geisen 1995). 
Civic nationalism is the broader form, in which anyone may acquire legal status as a citizen of 
the nation-state and thereby claim to be a member of that community (Reeskens and Hooghe 
2010). Ethnic nationalism arises from common ancestral, religious, linguistic, cultural or 
historical roots and generally entails that an individual be born into a community (Fligstein, et al 
2012). These identity orientations often influence an individual’s understanding of their political 
system (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004) and motivate stronger political engagement 
when individuals perceive a threat to national interests (Fowler and Kam 2007).  
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In the EU, an individual’s identity orientations have been found to work both for and 
against popular support for the European integration. The EU’s founders hoped that economic 
integration might bind together different national communities and eventually create a pan-
European sense of identity, whether civic or ethnic in nature. That outcome does not appear to 
have materialized. The already small number of Europeans who identify with the EU has 
declined over the last decade, while the strength of national attachments has only increased 
during that same period (Polyakova and Fligstein 2012). What is more, the macro-salience 
argument would suggest that the changing economic environment may have had a noticeable 
effect on the salience of identity-based criteria. The tendency to identify with a specific 
territorial community often coincides with the demarcation of in-groups and out-groups; 
indeed, for some individuals, national identity is defined by who does and does not qualify as a 
member of the community (Brewer 1996). These affective orientations thus create the 
potential for inter-group conflict (Brewer 2001), which is often exacerbated in situations where 
perceived or actual competition exists over power or resources (Hardin 1995, Monroe, et al 
2000). In most member states, both the financial crisis and the resulting austerity policies have 
stretched thin the resources available for public use. Additionally, the fact that the winners and 
losers of the economic malaise are easily connected to groups (i.e., nations) further raises the 
distinct possibility that the economic rescue packages stimulate not only a rise in economic 
concerns but also drive nationalist sentiments to the fore: Dutch and German citizens, for 
example, pay into the rescue pot; crisis countries benefit from it, so there is a simplistic and 
easy way to identity winners and losers on the basis of national identity. This seems to 
constitute a near-ideal context of group-conflict based on competition for scarce resources 
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(Sniderman and Haagendorn 2008). The ongoing migrant crisis, which dates back some years, 
may have further elevated perceived threats to the national well-being.   Such an environment 
may serve to activate or energize an individual’s nationalist orientation, particularly as they 
evaluate an entity (the EU) at the center of most of these developments.  
H2: The salience of identity-related criteria for assessments of EU democracy has 
increased over time and, especially, since the advent of the European financial crisis.  
 
Methods 
To investigate these expectations, this paper relies on data from the Eurobarometer 
Representation Dataset (ERD). The European Commission began the Eurobarometer public 
opinion surveys in 1973, for the purpose of “monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the 
Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its 
work” (the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Union 2015). As part of this project, 
the Commission fields at least two ‘Standard Eurobarometer’ surveys each year, which includes 
a series of standardized questions on European integration, the EU institutions and EU policies. 
The ERD collects nearly 400 measures of political behavior at the European level from 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1987 and 2014. 
 The Eurobarometer regularly asks respondents to rate their level of satisfaction with the 
way democracy works in the European Union. Based on the response metric, we use the 
following scale in our analyses: (1) “not at all satisfied”, (2) “not very satisfied”, (3) “don’t 
know”, (4) “fairly satisfied”, and (5) “very satisfied”.2 The Eurobarometer asks this question 
                                                            
2 Much of the research on EU attitudes measures support for the EU with a question from the Eurobarometer 
surveys that asks respondents whether they think their country’s membership in the EU is a good thing or a bad 
thing. This question has the advantage of appearing in most Eurobarometer surveys between 1972 and 2010 and 
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every year since 1993, with the exceptions of 1996 and 2008. Across those 20 years, the mean 
varies between 2.82 (SD=1.26) in 1998 to 3.23 (SD=1.18) in 2009. The EU tends to perform 
worse on this metric as time advances. Figure 1 illustrates the over-time patterns in satisfaction 
with EU democracy in each of the EU member states. In general, support has declined in 
Southern Europe in recent years; remained steady or declined in most East European countries; 
and remained steady or even increased in most of Western Europe. To account for the 
influence of economic perceptions, we construct both sociotropic and egotropic additive 
measures of expectations for economic performance over the next 12 months. The first 
measure includes expectations about the general economic situation and the employment 
situation in the respondent’s country. The second measure includes expectations about the 
financial situation of the respondent’s household and the respondent’s personal job situation. 
Both measures are coded from (2) “worse” to (6) “better”. We also control for the salience of 
economic issues using a Eurobarometer question asking respondents to identify the two most 
important problems (from a list of choices) facing their country today. Five of the possible 
responses suggest economic issues matter to an individual: taxation, pensions, unemployment, 
rising prices/inflation and the economic situation. We construct an additive measure that 
ranges from “0. No economic issues mentioned” to “2. Two economic issues mentioned”.  
                                                            
thus permits scholars to track changes in support over time. There are, however, a number of disadvantages to this 
measure. First, the question focuses on support for the European project as a whole, rather than specific 
institutions or policies within the EU, and thus does not allow for much nuance in public opinion on questions 
about European integration. Unsurprisingly, the public exhibits little variation in expressed levels of support for 
and opposition to the EU over the period of time covered by the question. More specifically, the question does not 
allow us to investigate the central argument of the procedural approach: that individuals are unhappy with the 
EU’s political processes and institutions (rather than the EU project as a whole). Finally, the Eurobarometer 
stopped asking this question in 2010. As such, this question does not allow us to compare public opinion before 
and after the European financial crisis.     
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The effects of identity-based concerns are accounted for with the Eurobarometer 
question asking each respondent how she sees herself in the future. The Eurobarometer 
includes the responses: “1. (NATIONALITY) only 2. (NATIONALITY) and European 3. European 
and (NATIONALITY) and 4. European only”. Because over 90% of respondents choose one of the 
first two responses, we collapse the last three responses into a single category (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008). The resulting dichotomous variable is either (1) “(NATIONALITY) only” or (2) some 
identification with Europe.  
We measure political criteria for evaluating EU democracy with a standard 
Eurobarometer question asking each respondent to select, from a list of positive and negative 
prompts, the word that best indicates what the EU means to them personally. Two such items 
are that the EU is “wasteful” and “bureaucratic”, both of which would suggest that a 
respondent doubts the quality of procedural representation at the European level. Our analyses 
also include a number of demographic controls that have been found to influence political 
attitudes in past research, including age, gender, education, left/right ideology, frequency of 
political discussion and occupational status. Appendix A describes the construction of these 
control variables.  
The macro-salience argument presumes that the political and economic context 
conditions public perceptions of the EU; more specifically, that economic criteria have greater 
influence on evaluations of EU democracy in less affluent countries and that political criteria 
have a stronger effect in more affluent countries. Economic conditions within each EU member 
state are measured with data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Worldwide 
Economic Outlook Database on GDP per capita and unemployment. In both instances, we take 
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the average of the 12 months prior to the survey in question. To account for the possible 
effects of the political environment (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010), we use data from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, et al 2010). The WGI assesses the 
quality of governance in 215 countries between 1996 and 2014, rating countries along six 
dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. On each dimension, the scores vary between –
2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores indicating better-performing political structures. 
 
Results 
 Following the recent economic and migrant crises, one might easily conclude that both 
nationalism and economic anxieties are on the rise across Europe. After all, many people are 
likely to perceive some level of threat to their economic security or the cultural homogeneity of 
their country. Instead, as has been suggested elsewhere (Fligstein 2016), we find that levels of 
nationalism and economic anxiety have remained steady or even declined in most European 
countries. The mean score for our measure of exclusive national identity was much higher in 
the late 90s and early 00s than over the last six years covered in the ERD3.  The highest two 
scores since 1993 were .49 in 1998 and .5 in 1997. The years 2012-2014 actually register some 
of the lowest mean scores (between .42 and .43) in the 22-year span of time. This pattern 
appears to hold up as we break down the analysis by country. Figure 2 presents the mean 
scores on this measure by country. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, France, Ireland, Italy, 
and the UK), levels of nationalism has declined. In others, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
                                                            
3 The mean score on the identity measure across all of the years is .45 with .03 standard deviation. 
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Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden, nationalism has increased. In the remaining countries, the 
direction is ambiguous.  
 A similar pattern emerges with the measure of national economic forecast. Generally, 
the most optimistic forecasts for the economy took place in the 1990s. Again, higher scores on 
this measure suggest that respondents anticipate that particular economic conditions will be 
better 12 months after the time of the interview. The highest mean scores of 4.13, 4.09 and 
4.08 were in 1999, 1994 and 2000 respectively. The lowest scores of 3.32, 3.34 and 3.37 were 
recorded in 2008, 2003 and 2009. The most recent years, however, these fall above the mean 
score for the entire time period.4 In 2014, for instance, the mean forecast was 3.95. As shown 
in Figure 3, the trends in each country largely follow this pattern – publics became a bit more 
optimistic again after the crisis. Altogether, these patterns suggest that economic perceptions 
dipped during the height of the global recession (as would be expected), but rebounded over 
the last few years.  
This paper seeks to ascertain whether nationalist sentiments and/or economic anxieties 
have a stronger effect on members of the public that harbor such thoughts in later years. In 
other words, does the economy and/or identity-related fears matter more or less for attitudes 
toward the EU as time moves forward? Our preliminary analyses suggest some surprising 
results. Figure 4 displays the average bivariate effects of economic forecasts on satisfaction 
with EU democracy between 1993 and 2014. The EU countries are split into five groups based 
on the era in which each country joined the EU, a classification that also roughly corresponds 
with regional location and thus their aggregate economic conditions. The influence of economic 
                                                            
4 The mean score for the measure of economic perceptions is 3.67 with .23 standard deviation. 
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perceptions on EU democracy satisfaction has increased since the start of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the original EU-6 as well as the 1970s and 1980s enlargement cohorts. However, the 
economy has mattered as much for performance evaluations of the EU at other points in the 
history of European integration. In fact, in most of Western Europe, the economy had a more 
pronounced effect on EU attitudes in 1997 and as strong an effect in 2007 as at any point since 
the start of the crisis. Eastern Europe diverges from this pattern, with utilitarian concerns 
assuming much greater importance after the crisis.  
 Figure 5 documents the relationship between national identity and satisfaction with EU 
democracy over a similar stretch of time. The downward trend in these graphs suggests that 
identity matters more for EU attitudes. Some variation exists across the regions. In the 1970s 
cohort (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark), the effect of such concerns already 
increased slightly in the early 2000s. Clearly though, across Europe, the onset of the debt crisis 
corresponds with increased tendencies for those who identify exclusively with their national 
community to evaluate the performance of the EU negatively. This result stands out all the 
more in light of the earlier finding that the percentage of people who identify exclusively with 
their national community is in decline in many countries. So, while fewer people adopt 
exclusively nationalist orientations in later years, the strength of those orientations matter far 
more for political attitudes as time moves forward. Such trends may be especially problematic 
for the unity of the European project, as decision-makers must cope with a growing block of 
individuals who are especially motivated by the EU’s perceived threat to national culture.  
 Next, we plot the relationship between utilitarian considerations and EU democracy 
satisfaction based on models that incorporate a number of demographic control variables. 
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Given the similarities in the bivariate models between the different regions of Western Europe, 
we limit the plots for these models to Western and Eastern Europe. Some of the controls are 
not included in every Eurobarometer survey. As a result, the graphs do not include as many 
years as the bivariate analyses. As shown in Figure 6, the trend line in the Western Europe 
graph largely resembles the results of the bivariate analyses, although there is a slightly larger 
increase in the salience of instrumental considerations after the onset of the debt crisis. 
Interestingly, the influence of the economy increases dramatically in the East in the first couple 
years immediately after the crisis, but then declines back to pre-crisis levels over the last few 
years covered by the surveys. The graphs in Figure 7 are derived from the same models with 
demographic controls. Here again, these results mimic the earlier bivariate models; the 
importance of nationalism increases noticeably after the start of the fiscal crisis, in both 
Western and Eastern Europe.  
 As a final check, building on these basic models, we conduct two analyses that 
incorporate both micro and macro-level predictors of democracy satisfaction with the EU5 and 
then use the results to plot the marginal effects of both economic forecasts and exclusive 
national identity. Figure 8 displays the marginal effects of national economic forecasts. The 
shorter timeframe – again due to the Eurobarometer not including the same module of 
questions in every survey – and the addition of several new variables flattens the line prior to 
the debt crisis. In all likelihood, this is simply because these figures do not include any dates 
prior to 2003, but the takeaway is that the importance of economic criteria increased quite 
noticeably in the West in the years after the crisis. In Eastern Europe, as with the earlier figures, 
                                                            
5 The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix.  
16 
 
the influence of economic criteria picked up in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, but has 
already declined to pre-crisis levels. Figure 9 plots the marginal effects of identity based on the 
more comprehensive model. These graphs confirm the early results – the effects of identity 
have increased dramatically since the crisis. The primary difference from the earlier figures lies 
in the mid-00s, where identity appears to have had a stronger role in Western Europe than 
suggested by the basic model. Overall, however, these analyses confirm the expectations of our 
second hypothesis. The declining economic environment has served to promote the use of 
utilitarian considerations when evaluating the EU, but has done even more to elevate the 
importance of identity-related fears.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper tries to answer a simple question: have the standards by which European 
publics evaluate European integration changed as a result of the most severe economic crisis 
since the founding of the EU? The answer is affirmative but in unanticipated ways. First, when 
viewed from 2010 onwards, economic conditions have become more important in nearly all 
regions of Europe after the economic crisis unfolded. This is unsurprising given the severity of 
problems, and the difficult policy decisions governments in especially crisis-countries had to 
make in reducing public outlays. We note, however, that to a surprising degree, economic 
factors do not become more important when we adopt a longer time series. The strength of 
relationships hover roughly at the same level in various regions—they are significant (not 
surprising given the large sample size for each year) but do not reflect a marked rise when 
compared to their significance in the 1990s. In short, the importance of economic concerns 
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raised the importance of economic factors in the short run but did not fundamentally alter its 
long-term importance.  
In sharp contrast, we see a significant increase in the importance of national identity as 
a basis for EU evaluations nearly everywhere. Some of the changes are stark, as in Western 
Europe where the influence of exclusive national identity often more than doubles in impact. 
The only exception to this pattern is the CEE region, in large part because national identity has 
always been important to publics in newer democracies. This is no doubt related to the fact 
that these countries had achieved independence only in the early 1990s so that the idea of 
relinquishing sovereignty to the EU did not sit well with publics (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
2006). The crisis accentuated the relationship in CEE, but did not significantly increase it. In the 
West, throughout the 90s and 00s, national identity was considerably weaker as a source of EU 
evaluations, though it never seized to be completely irrelevant. By 2014, however, national 
identity has risen in importance in the West to a point where it influences EU evaluations 
roughly to the same degree as in CEE. Viewed cross-nationally and over time, then, Europe has 
been thrown back by at least a decade as far as the influence of exclusive national identities on 
EU evaluations is concerned.  
Theoretically, the paper both provides some support for and raises questions about the 
macro-salience argument. In support of it, we note that the rise of national identity both 
reflects and drives the debates over nationalism. We obviously cannot speak to the question of 
how much such nationalism is a reflection of elite debates or how much it drives them. What 
we can say is that the fiery nationalist overtones that can be observed in the mass media, such 
as when the Greek media portrays Merkel as Hitler, resonate with voters. This is yet another 
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sign that right-wing neo-populist parties will continue to find a receptive audience within the 
electorate.  Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of mass publics, electoral 
opportunities for nationalist appeals have improved substantially since the economic crisis, so 
that we may now expect these parties to compete successfully for some time to come. This, of 
course, should be monitored as newer surveys become available—which we intend to do.   
This paper raises as many questions as it answers. For one, we would like to know which 
sub-groups of voters are most likely to exhibit the rise of nationalism.  Is the left as likely to rely 
on exclusive national identities as the right? Initial analyses suggest that we observe the rise 
across-the board, but a firmer answer must await more analyses than we can present here. Do 
various social groups rely to an equal degree on national identities? We might hypothesize that, 
on the grounds that economically insecure individuals may be more receptive to nationalist 
appeals than those who are better off economically. Again, preliminary analyses suggest that 
this not the case—we find that national identity increases in relevance across the entire 
occupational spectrum.  
While we clearly need more analyses, the results are worrisome as we find no evidence 
that national identity is a surrogate for economic self-interests. If this finding stands the test of 
more analyses, it would suggest that national identity has become a potent force that exhibits 
all the signs of a clear identity-based factor: all members of a community adopt a similar 
yardstick against which the EU is judged. If that is the case, the EU may face greater resistance 
to further integration than many observers sympathetic to the integration project had feared.  
 
Appendix:  
The final graphs presented in Figures 8 and 9 are based on a model of EU democracy satisfaction that 
includes a number of micro and macro-level predictors. The construction of those predictors are 
described below and that is followed by the analysis itself in Table 1.  
EU Democracy Satisfaction: “On the whole, are you very satisfied (5), fairly satisfied (4), not very 
satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy works in the EU?” The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the coding for this paper. ‘Don’t know’ responses were coded as 3.  
National Economic Expectations and Personal Economic Expectations: The Eurobarometer asks a series 
of questions about the economy. Each question begins: “What are your expectations for the next twelve 
months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same when it comes to…” Two prompts 
focus on the national economy: the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) and the employment 
situation in (OUR COUNTRY). Two prompts focus on the respondent’s personal situation: the financial 
situation of your household and your personal job situation. The sociotropic measure (national forecast) 
adds together responses for the national prompts with responses coded as worse (1), the same (2) and 
better (3). The resulting measure varies between a negative forecast (2) and a positive forecast (6). The 
same coding is applied to the responses for the personal prompts to develop the egotropic measure.  
Exclusiveness of National Identity: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (NATIONALITY) only, 
(NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY) or European only. This variable was 
recoded such that (NATIONALITY) only was 1 and all other responses were coded as 0.  
Perception of EU Waste: Respondents are asked “what does the EU mean to you personally?” and then 
provided a series of prompts. Two such prompts include “bureaucracy” and “waste of money”. Every 
instance in which a respondent mentions one of these prompts is coded as 1 and we then add the total 
number. The measure varies from 0 to 2.  
Salience of Economic Issues: Respondents are asked “what do you think are the two most important 
issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” and then provided a series of prompts. These prompts 
include “taxation”, “pensions”, “rising prices/inflation”, “unemployment” and the “economic situation”. 
Every instance in which a respondent mentions one of these prompts is coded as 1 and we then add the 
total number. The measure varies from 0 up to 5. 
Frequency of Political Discussion: “When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you 
discuss frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1) about national political matters?” The numbers in 
parentheses indicate the coding for this paper. 
Education: Respondents are asked “how old were you when you stopped full-time education?” We 
substituted in the current age for those who replied “still studying”. Those that replied between the 
ages of 21 and 86 were coded as 1. Those that replied between the ages of 16 and 19 were coded as 2. 
Those that replied 15 and under were coded as 3.  
Left-Right Ideology: “In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place 
your views on this scale?” Based on this question, we created a number of left/right orientation 
measures, each of which codes a couple self-placements as 1 and all other responses as 0. Left/Right 1 is 
for those who identify as a 1 or 2; Left/Right 2 for those who place themselves as 3 or 4; Left/Right 3 is 5 
and 6; Left/Right 4 is 7 and 8; Left/Right 5 is 9 and 10; Left/Right Other is for all respondents who could 
not or would not place themselves on the scale.  
Sex: Male (1), Female (0) 
Age: “How old are you?” Based on this question, we created a number of age cohort measures, each of 
which codes individuals of a certain age as 1 and all other individuals as 0. Age 1 is for those 62 years or 
older. Age 2 is for those between the ages of 42 and 61. Age 3 is for those between the ages of 25 and 
41. Age 4 is for those under the age of 25.  
Occupational Measures: “What is your current occupation?” Based on this question, we created a 
number of occupational measures, each of which codes individuals working in a certain field as 1 and all 
other individuals as 0. Farmer/Fisher is for those who replied “Farmer” or “Fisherman”. 
Business/Professional is for those who replied “Professional” (such as a lawyer or medical professional), 
“Owner of a Shop”, “Business Proprietor” or “Employed Professional”. White Collar includes those who 
replied they were “General Management”, “Middle Management”, “Employed, working at a desk”, 
“Employed, but travelling (as salesperson)”, “Employed in a service job”, and “Supervisor”. Unemployed 
includes those who report being responsible for “looking after the home”, “Student” and 
“Unemployed”. Retired captures those who self-report as retired.  
  
Table 1: Explaining Satisfaction with EU Democracy (basis for Figure 8 and Figure 9) 
 Utilitarian Only  Utilitarian and Identity  
National Economic Expectations .09 (.01)** .09 (.01)**  
Year*National Econ Expectations   
1994  .03 (.01)* 
2004 .03 (.01)**  
2014 .04 (.01)**  .03 (.01)**  
Exclusiveness of National Identity   -.29 (.03)**  
Year*Exclusive National Identity   
1994  -.01 (.04)  
2014  -.25 (.03)**  
Personal Economic Expectations .05 (.002)**  .05 (.002)** 
Perception of EU Waste -.5 (.02)**   
Year*Waste   
2004 .1 (.02)**   
2014 .14 (.02)**   
Salience of Economic Issues .01 (.003)**   
Frequency of Political Discussion  .04 (.003)**   
Education -.07 (.003)**  -.002 (.003) 
Left/Right 1 -.21 (.01)**  -.2 (.01)** 
Left/Right 2 -.02 (.01)*  -.05 (.01)** 
Left/Right 4 .1 (.01)**  .04 (.01)** 
Left/Right 5 .02 (.01)  .02 (.01) 
Left/Right Other -.12 (.01)**  -.03 (.01)** 
Sex .03 (.004)**  -.04 (.004)** 
Age 1 -.05 (.02)*  -.03 (.02)  
Age 2 -.11 (.02)**  -.12 (.02)** 
Age 3 -.09 (.02)**  -.09 (.02)** 
Age 4 .01 (.02)  -.03 (.02) 
Farmer/Fisher .09 (.02)**  .09 (.02)** 
Business/Professional .09 (.01)**  .01 (.01) 
White Collar  .08 (.01)**  .03 (.01)** 
Unemployed -.01 (.01)  -.03 (.01)** 
Retired -.002 (.01)  -.02 (.01)** 
Country-Level Variables   
GDP Per Capita .00002 (.000002)** .000002 (.000001)* 
Unemployment -.03 (.001)**  -.04 (.001)**  
Procedural Quality .13 (.04)**  
East/West -.7 (.11)**  -.3 (.08)**  
Constant 2.78 (.1)** 3.4 (.08)** 
Random Effects Parameters   
National Economic Expectations .001 (.0003)  .001 (.0003)  
Random Intercept between Countries .09 (.03)  .07 (.02) 
N individual-level observations 197, 595 219,574 
N macro-level observations  27 27 
 
Figure 1: Mean Scores for EU Democracy Satisfaction by Country  
 
Mean scores of EU democracy satisfaction, where 1 means dissatisfaction and 5 satisfaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean Scores for National Identity Exclusiveness by Country  
 
Mean scores of exclusive national identity, where 1 means exclusive national identity and 0 includes 
some element of a European identity.  
  
Figure 3: Mean Scores for National Economic Forecasts by Country  
 
Mean scores of national economic forecasts, where 2 means negative and 6 positive expectations. 
  
Figure 4: Bivariate Relationships between EU Democracy Satisfaction and Economic Perceptions  
EU-6             1970s Enlargement 
  
1980s Enlargement           1990s Enlargement 
  
CEEC Enlargement  
 
Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the 
interaction between national economic forecasts and year constitutes the independent variables. 
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Figure 5: Bivariate Relationships between EU Democracy Satisfaction and National Identity  
EU-6             1970s Enlargement 
  
1980s Enlargement           1990s Enlargement 
 \ 
CEEC Enlargement  
 
Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the 
interaction between exclusive national identity and year constitutes the independent variables. 
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Figure 6: EU Democracy Satisfaction with Economic Perceptions and Demographic Controls in Western 
and Eastern Europe 
Western Europe            Eastern Europe 
   
Figure 7: EU Democracy Satisfaction with National Identity Exclusiveness and Demographic Controls in 
Western and Eastern Europe 
Western Europe            Eastern Europe 
   
Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the 
interaction between national economic forecasts and year (in Figure 6) and between exclusive national 
identity and year (in Figure 7) constitutes the independent variables along with controls for education, 
sex, left/right ideology groupings, age cohorts and occupational cohorts. 
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 Figure 8: EU Democracy Satisfaction with Economic Perceptions and Macro-Level Controls in Western 
and Eastern Europe 
Western Europe            Eastern Europe 
   
Figure 9: EU Democracy Satisfaction with National Identity Exclusiveness and Macro-Level Controls in 
Western and Eastern Europe 
Western Europe            Eastern Europe 
   
Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the 
interaction between national economic forecasts and year (in Figure 8) and between exclusive national 
identity and year (in Figure 9) constitutes the independent variables along with controls for education, 
sex, left/right ideology groupings, age cohorts and occupational cohorts, personal economic forecasts, 
GDP per capita, unemployment, procedural quality, location in Eastern or Western Europe and 
(depending on the model) issue salience, frequency of political discussion, and perceptions of the EU as 
wasteful.  
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